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巴菲特－－我为何不看好美元？
巴菲特－－我为何不看好美元？作者：Warren E. Buffett
美国日渐扩大的贸易逆差让我们逐步失去了立国之本。这里有一个解决的办法，而且我们有必要立即行动
我要就美国的贸易逆差问题发出警告，同时我也要为解决这个问题献计献策。但首先我需要提醒大家，你们可能会出于两个原因对我所说的内容表示怀疑。首先，我对宏观经济走势的预测一向不能鼓舞人心。例如，过去的二十年里我在通货膨胀问题上总是显得风声鹤唳，草木皆兵。这方面的例子还有很多，早在 1987 年我就公开表示，我对日渐扩大的贸易逆差感到忧心忡忡──但正如大家所了解的，我们不仅顶住了贸易逆差带来的压力，而且发展得欣欣向荣。因此，在贸易问题方面，我至少喊过一次“狼来了”。尽管如此，我还是要喊狼来了，而且这一次我有伯克希尔－哈撒韦公司（Berkshire Hathaway）的资金支持。截至 2002 年春，我已有近 72 年没有买过外汇了。但自那以后，伯克希尔公司斥巨资购买了──而且现在已经持有──若干种外汇。我不会透露它们具体是哪几种货币；事实上，我购买了哪些外汇与我要讲的观点毫不相干。重要的是这一举动所暗含的意义：我持有其他货币就意味著我认为美元将贬值。
我既是一个美国公民也是一个投资者，因此我真切希望我的这些举动是错误的。由于美元贬值，伯克希尔公司和我们的股东可能会在生活的其他方面遭受损失，与之相比，公司从外汇交易中获得的任何收益都将显得苍白无力。但是，作为伯克希尔－哈撒韦公司的领导人，我的责任是以合理的方式对公司的资金进行投资。我之所以最终决定把钱投向我一直以来不感兴趣的领域，是因为我们的贸易逆差已经达到了极其糟糕的程度，请恕我直言，当前的贸易逆差已局?致我们国家的“净资产”正以惊人的速度向海外转移。这种资产转移如果长时间持续下去将酿成大祸。
为了能清楚地阐明原因，请大家跟我来一次狂想之旅，我们的目的地是两座与世隔绝的小岛──“挥霍岛”和“勤俭岛”，这两座岛面积相同，左右相邻。在这两座小岛上，土地是唯一的固定资产，而小岛的社会结构也非常原始，居民们需要的只是食物，而且也只生产食物。事实上，岛上的每位居民每天工作八小时就能创造出足够维系自己生活的食物。在很长的一段时间里，他们就一直这样生活著。两座小岛上的所有人都按照规定每天工作八小时，这也就是说每个社会都能自给自足。
但是，勤俭岛上勤劳的居民有一天做出决定，他们要多储存一些食物并利用这些食物进行投资，于是他们开始每天工作 16 小时。在这种模式下，勤俭岛的居民继续依靠八小时工作所生产的食物维持生计，与此同时他们把相同数量的食物出口到挥霍岛上，这也是他们唯一可以出口的地方。
挥霍岛的居民对这一变化感到欣喜若狂，因为他们从此以后可以不再依靠辛苦劳作为生，而且还能享受到与以往一样的食物。当然，这一过程中自然还需要等价交换物──但是对挥霍岛的居民来说，这种交换并无大碍：勤俭岛居民只是想用自己的食物交换挥霍岛的债券（这种债券自然是按照“挥霍岛币”计价发行的
一段时期以后，勤俭岛的居民积累了大量此类债券，而持有这些债券就意味著，勤俭岛的居民可以凭借债券索取挥霍岛未来的生产成果。挥霍岛上的一些权威人士发觉到危机的降临。据他们预测，对挥霍岛居民而言，这种既要维持他们的食物所需又要偿还他们所累积的债务──或仅仅是偿还债务利息──的交换活动最终将迫使他们每天工作八小时以上。但是，挥霍岛的居民根本没有兴趣听这些权威人士的逆耳忠言。
与此同时，勤俭岛上的居民开始感到紧张不安。他们问：拿著一个懒惰的小岛发放的债券能有什么好处？于是勤俭岛的居民改变了他们的战略：他们继续持有部分债券，但他们把大部分债券都卖给了挥霍岛的居民以换取挥霍岛币，随后勤俭岛居民利用这笔收入去购买挥霍岛的土地。最终，勤俭岛的居民完全拥有了挥霍岛。
从那一刻起，挥霍岛的居民不得不面对等价交换的悲惨结果：现在他们不但每天必须工作八个小时以维持生计──他们已经没有东西可供交换了──而且还要加班加点地工作，以偿还债务利息并向勤俭岛居民支付土地租金，因为他们当初一时大意，把这些土地都卖给了勤俭岛的居民。结果，勤俭岛居民利用收购而不是征服的手段使挥霍岛沦为了自己的殖民地。
当然，有人会争辩说，挥霍岛居民未来的生产成果必须长期运往勤俭岛，但这些生产成果的现值只相当于勤俭岛居民最初放弃的产量，因此从这点来看这是一项公平交易。但是，由于挥霍岛上的一代居民不劳而获，挥霍岛未来的若干代居民就得用毕生的时间来还债，这种情形如果用经济学家的话来说，就是颇为戏剧性的“隔代不平等现象”．
且让我们以一个家庭为例来考虑这个问题：假设我沃伦•巴菲特使用到期可支付的巴菲特家族借据来购买我一生所需的所有消费品，而这些债务及利息将由我的子孙后代以货物和服务的形式偿还，人们可能会把这种情形看作是巴菲特家族与债权人之间的平等交易。但是，自我以后的几代巴菲特家族的成员可能都不会赞同这项交易（他们甚至有可能试图赖帐，但愿他们不要这么做）。
让我们再考虑一下那两座小岛的情形：面对著有史以来数额最庞大的债务利息，挥霍岛政府迟早会做出决定，实施有可能引发严重通货膨胀的政策──即发行更多的挥霍岛币以冲减每张货币的价值。挥霍岛政府的理由是，毕竟那些令人不安的挥霍岛债券只是索取相应数目的挥霍岛币而已，而非这些货币的相应价值。简而言之，让挥霍岛币贬值可以缓解挥霍岛的财政危机。
正是因为看到了这样的前景，所以如果我是勤俭岛的居民，我会选择直接拥有挥霍岛的土地而不是该岛政府所发行的债券。大多数政府都认为，强制没收外国人的资产在道义上令人难以接受，而如果采取措施冲减外国人所持债券的购买力则相对稳妥一些。毕竟，在掩人耳目情况下的偷窃要好于强取豪夺。
说了这么多岛国间的事情，那么这些事与美国之间究竟有何干系呢？简而言之，自第二次世界大战后直到 20 世纪 70 年代初的这段时间里，我们一直是按勤俭岛的方式辛勤工作，通常情况下我们出口的产品远多于我们的进口量。与此同时，我们把富余的产品投资海外，结果我们的净投资额──即以我们持有的外国资产减去外国人持有的美国资产──从 1950 年的 370 亿美元增长到了 1970 年的 680 亿美元（这是根据政府当时使用的计算方法得出的，当然政府后来又对计算方法进行了修改）。当时，我们国家的“净资产”总值既包括了国内的所有财富，同时也包括了我们在世界其他地区的相当一部分财富。
另外，对世界其他地区而言，当时的美国完全处于净所有人的地位，所以我们意识到建立在贸易盈余之上的净投资收入已经成为了投资资金的第二大来源。我们国家的财政状况与个人的情况相类似，个人一方面会把自己的部分工资存起来，另一方面则会利用从现有储蓄中得到的分红进行再投资
20 世纪 70 年代末，这种贸易形势发生了逆转，贸易逆差出现了，最初的逆差额约占 GDP 的 1%。这种情况并不算糟，尤其是考虑到我们的净投资收入仍然是正值。实际上，如果以复利方式计算我们仍然在盈利，我们的净资产结余在 1980 年达到了 3,600 亿美元的峰值。
然而，从那以后我们就走起了下坡路，而且在近五年中下降之势还在迅速加快。如今，我们的年均贸易逆差额已经超过了 GDP 的 4%。同样令人感到不安的是，世界其他地区拥有的美国资产已经比我们拥有的其他国家资产多了 2.5 万亿美元，这个数字大得惊人。这 2.5 万亿美元的资产中，有一部分投在了索赔凭证──即美国的债券，其中既有政府债券也有私营企业债券──上，还有一部分资金则投入了地产和股票等资产。
实际上，长期以来我们国家的做派就有如一个拥有万顷良田的大富之家。为了能消费我们生产能力所不能满足的这 4% 的商品──也就是我们的贸易逆差──我们每天都在出售农场的土地，而且我们拿现有资产所做的抵押也在一天天增加。
为了能正确审视外国人拥有的这 2.5 万亿美元净资产，我们拿它与价值 12 万亿美元的公开发售的美国股票，或者是具有相同价值的美国住宅用房地产，再或者是我所预计的总额达 50 万亿美元的国家财富相比较。比较的结果显示，已经被转往海外的资产非同小可──以国家财富为例，它占到了其中的 5%。
然而，更为重要的是，按照贸易逆差目前的发展速度来看，外国人拥有的美国资产将以每年 5,000 亿美元的速度继续增长，也就是说这种逆差每年都会使外国人手中的美国国家财富增加 1 个百分点。随著这种净资产的逐步增加，我们的年均净投资收入也将不断流失。结果是，我们得向世界其他地区支付越来越多的股票分红和利息，而不是像以往那样收取分红和利息。我们已经进入了综合收入出现亏损的阶段──再见，快乐时光；你好，艰辛岁月。
经济学的基础知识告诉我们，任何国家都不可能长期承受数额巨大、持续增长的贸易逆差。当贸易逆差积累到某一点时，清算的时刻也就到了，我们国家无节制的快乐消费将因为汇率的调整，以及债权国不愿接受挥霍无度者无限制签发的借据而终止。而这种情况实际上已经在世界其他地区发生过，正如我们看到的那样，许多肆意挥霍的国家由于突然失去贷款，已经苦苦挣扎了几十年。
然而，美国的情况却非常特殊。实际上，我们今天能为所欲为是因为我们过去的财政状况非常好──而且因为我们富甲四方。我们的债权人既没有怀疑我们的偿债能力，也没有对我们的还款意愿产生疑忌，而且我们还有无数令人满意的资产可供我们交换消费品。换言之，凭著我们的国家信用卡，我们可以购买数量惊人的商品。但是，这张信用卡是有最高贷款限额的。
这种以资产换消费品的交易现在就该停止，而且我还为终止这种交易制定了计划。我的解决办法非常巧妙，其实它就是一种关税，只是名目不同而已。但这是一种吸收了大部分自由市场精髓的关税，它既不对具体行业实施保护，也不惩罚某个国家，更不会引发贸易战。这项计划将扩大我们的出口，同时还很有可能增加全世界的贸易总量。按照该计划，我们可以在美元不贬值的情况下实现贸易收支平衡，否则的话我相信美元几乎注定要贬值。
为了实现贸易收支平衡，我们将向美国所有的出口商发放一种我所说的“进口许可证”（Import Certificates），其数额与他们以美元计的出口额相等。每个出口商将相应地把进口许可证卖给那些希望把商品进口到美国的相关各方
──外国的出口商抑或是本地的进口商。例如，进口商要进口 100 万美元的商品，他就需要有进口许可证，而这个许可证正是 100 万美元出口商品的副产品。如此一来，贸易平衡自然也就得以实现。由于我们每月的出口总量大约为 800 亿美元，因此我们就要发放巨额的等量进口许可证──即每月 800 亿份进口许可证──而且人们肯定会把这些许可证拿到极其活跃的流动市场中进行交易。至于哪些希望把商品出口到我 们国家的出口商将得到这些许可证，以及他们愿意以多高的价格购买许可证，都将由市场竞争来决定（在我想来，许可证的使用期限应该要短，大概在半年左右，这样投机分子就不会有兴趣囤积居奇了）。为了能形象地说明这个问题，让我们假定每张进口许可证的售价为 10 美分──即每一美元出口商品的背后都有 10 美分的盈余。在其他条件不变的情况下，这个数字就意味著，美国的生产商把自己的商品拿到出口市场上销售所获得的收入要比在国内市场上销售多 10%，这 10% 的盈利即来自出售进口许可证。
在我看来，许多出口商会把这笔收入看作是成本的削减，这样它们就会降低产品在国际市场上的售价。日用类产品将尤为支撑这种措施。例如，如果铝在国内市场上的售价是 66 美分 / 磅，而进口许可证的价格是铝价的 10%，那么国内的铝生产商在国际市场上能够以 60 美分 / 磅的价格（加上运输费）销售，与此同时生产商还能获得正常的利润率。在这种情况下，美国产品将变得极具竞争力，出口也将扩大。照此发展，美国的就业机会也将有所增加。
当然，那些向美国出口商品的外国厂商将面临更加艰难的经济形势。但是，无论采取什么样的贸易“解决方案”──毫无疑问，解决方案必将出台──它们都得直面这个问题 [正如赫伯 斯坦（Herb Stein）所言：“如果某件事情无法永远运转下去，那它终将停止。”] 采用进口许可证的方法在某种程度上可以让那些向美国出口商品的国家获得极大的灵活性，因为这项计划并没有使某个具体行业或某种具体产品处于不利的位置。自由市场将最终决定哪些产品会销往美国，以及由谁来销售。而进口许可证只是决定了所售产品的美元累计总量。
为了清楚地说明在进口方面究竟会出现哪些情况，我们以进口商按 2 万美元的价格进口的轿车为例。按照新的计划并且假设进口许可证的售价为车价 的 10%，那么进口商的成本将升至 2.2 万美元。如果市场对这款轿车的需求非常旺盛，进口商则能够轻松地把这笔成本转嫁给美国的消费者。然而在通常情况下，市场竞争的作用会要求外国制造商即便不承担 2,000 美元进口许可证的全部费用，也要分担一部分相关成本。
当然，在这个进口许可证计划中并没有免费的午餐：美国公民也必将为此承担部分负面后果。绝大部分进口商品的价格将会上涨，而且那些具有竞争力的国产商品也将涨价。无论是从整体利益来看，还是从局部利益来看，进口许可证的成本都会像税收一样作用在消费者身上。 这是个严重的倒退。然而，不论是让美元不断贬值，或者对具体产品加征关税，抑或是对进口商品发放配额（在我看来，借助这些措施取得成功的几率很小）都同样存在著缺陷。我们会因为目前进口产品的涨价而承受一定的痛苦，但如果我们听任政府以前所未有的额度，拿自己国家的净资产去做交换，我们同样会承受痛苦，而且与后者相比较，前者的痛苦几乎算不了什么，而这才是最重要的。
我认为，进口许可证很快就会让美国走上贸易收支平衡的轨道，尽管与当前的进口水平相比较，这种收支平衡会有所下降，但它却优于当前的出口水 平。虽然说哪个行业最终能够通过“比较优势”的考验是由自由市场来决定的，但是进口许可证仍将适度帮助美国的各个产业提高在全球市场中的竞争力。
这种方法不会被那些净出口国所效仿，因为它们采取进口许可证制度毫无意义。那么主要的出口国会在其他方面采取报复性措施吗？这个计划会引发另一场史慕德－哈利（Smoot-Hawley）关税大战吗？（美国总统胡佛于 1930 年6 月签署“史慕德─哈利法案”，触发了全球贸易报复行动，导致世界贸易迅速滑落──译注。）几乎不会。在“史慕德－哈利法案”的时代，我们享有不合理的贸易顺差，而且我们希望予以维持。如今我们遭受著严重的贸易逆差，而且世界各国都认为我们应该纠正这个错误的局面。
几十年来，世界各国一直在与形式多样、错综复杂的惩罚性关税、出口补贴、配额和盯住美元的汇率等现象做斗争。长期以来，那些试图积聚巨额贸易顺差的出口大国都采取了许多抑制进口、鼓励出口的措施，但是至今仍未爆发过大规模的贸易战。一项促使全世界最大的贸易债务国实现收支平衡的建议肯定不会令某个国家陷于经济崩溃。世界出口大国在过去一直表现得较为理智，它们将来仍会如此──但与以往一样，它们也会试图让我们相信，出于自身利益的考虑，它们会采取完全不同的行动。
实行进口许可证计划后可能出现的结果是，出口国──在经过一些初期的调整后──将把它们的聪明才智用于鼓励从我国进口商品。让我们从中国的角度出发来看看这个问题，目前中国每年向我们出口价值约 1,400 亿美元的商品和服务，而仅从我们这里购买 250 亿美元的商品和服务。一旦实施了进口许可证制度，中国可能采取的措施之一是每年购买 1,150 亿份许可证，以弥补这个缺口。但是，它也可能做出另一种选择，即减少对美国的出口以降低对进口许可证的需求，或者增加从我们这儿购买的商品数量。而后一种 选择对中国来说可能最为适合，而且我们也希望它实施这一举措。
如果我们的出口得以增加，进口许可证的供应量将因此而扩大，那么进口许可证的市场价格也将随之下降。实际上，如果我们的出口能够显著增加，进口许可证就会变得毫无价值，而这个计划也将因此而失去存在的意义。当世界出口大国意识到这种情况的发生已经在所难免时，它们可能会立即取消正在实行的抑制从我国进口商品的机制
一旦我们开始实行进口许可证计划，我们也许要经历几年过渡期，在此期间我们会故意制造小额的贸易逆差，当我们逐步向著自己的目标迈进时， 这种贸易逆差将帮助世界其他国家和地区做出调整。在执行这项计划的同时，我们的政府可以每月公开拍卖一些“奖励性”的进口许可证，抑或是直接将它们赠与那些需要扩大出口额的欠发达国家。我们可以把第二种选择看成一种对外援助，这种形式的对外援助可能会取得明显成效，而且会很受欢迎。
在结束本文之前，我需要再次提醒诸位，我曾经喊过狼来了。一般来说，美国的灾难预言家的平均成功率很低。我们的国家一直都嘲笑那些对国家经济潜力和我们的活力持怀疑态度的人。许多悲观的预言家完全低估了激发我们克服困难的动力，而这些困难一度显得非常凶险。实际上，我们的国家依然 非常强盛，而我们的经济也同样欣欣向荣。
但我同时也认为，在贸易逆差这个问题上，我们正面临著困难，它将全面考验我们寻找解决办法的能力。美元逐步贬值并不是解决问题的答案。不错，美元贬值会在某种程度上减少我们的贸易逆差，但它却不足以阻止我国的净资产外流或是减少我们的投资收入逆差。
也许还有其他解决办法比我的更合理。但是，那些痴心妄想──以及时常与它做伴的各种幼稚想法──却不在我们的考虑之列。从我现在的观点来看，采取行动阻止国家财富外流势在必行，而进口许可证计划似乎是实现 这个目标的最有效办法，而且我们因此所承受的痛苦也最少。我只请大家牢记，这并不是个无所谓的小问题：举例来说，按照目前世界其他国家和地区在美国进行净投资的速度，我们公开交易的股票中，每年会有 4% 被它们购买和储存起来。
在评估伯克希尔─哈撒韦公司的商业选择时，我的合伙人查尔斯•芒格（Charles Munger）提出建议，他诙谐的祝愿应该引起我们的重视：“我所要知道的只是我将葬身何处，这样我就永远也不会走去那里。”我国的贸易政策制定者应该把他的警告引以为诫──请勿重蹈挥霍岛的覆辙。韬客外汇论坛p'N.V&fmI W'e i
译者：萧艾
外国人为什么不能抛售他们的美元？
当你阅读有关美元问题的文章时，这样的评论你见过多少遍：“分析家说，真正令他们感到担心的是，外国人将开始抛售美元”？
如果你下一次再看到类似的内容，尽管将之抛于脑后。事实是，外国人──就整体而言──是不会抛售他们所持的美元的。实际上，由于我们的贸易逆差，外国人不断有新的美元收入进账，因此他们也在不断增加对美国的投资。
当然，世界其他国家和地区的确有权选择他们应该以何种形式持有美国资产。例如，他们可以决定出售美国债券以购买美国股票。或者他们也可以进军美国的房地产业，就像日本人在 20 世纪 80 年代所做的那样。此外，他们采取的任何行动都会影响到美元的价格，特别是当采取这些行动的是那些急功近利的购买者或出售者时，就更是如此。但是，假设日本人既要从美国的房地产业中抽身而出，又想彻底摆脱所有美元资产，那他们仅仅把房地产出售给美国人是无法实现这些目的的，因为他们得到的付款还将是美元。而如果他们不把房地产卖给美国人──比方说卖给法国人，然后得到欧元──那么，这些资产将仍然保留在外国人手中。无论选择哪种方法出售，世界其他国家和地区所持有的美元资产都不会改变（除非与此同时美元价格发生变化）
{问题的底线是，除非其他国家（以整体来看待）从美国购买的商品和服务远多于我们从他们那里购买的商品和服务，否则他们是绝对不会减少对美国的投资规模的。这种情形就叫做美国贸易顺差，但我们目前不是顺差。
你可以设想一些激进的策略以改变这种状况。例如，世界其他国家和地区为美国提供巨额援助，这些援助将抵消我们的贸易逆差。但是，从现实的角度来考虑，面对我们的巨额贸易逆差，世界其他国家和地区不仅会牢牢把持已有的美国资产，而且还会继续增加持有量。当然，这也正是我们的国家净财富为什么逐渐流失海外的原因。
Buffett: Why I'm down on the dollar
Fortune. New York: Nov 10, 2003. Vol. 148, Iss. 10; pg. 106
[Headnote]
America's Growing Trade Deficit Is Selling the Nation Out From Under Us. Here's a Way to Fix the Problem-And We Need to Do It Now.
I'M ABOUT TO DELIVER A WARNING regarding the U.S. trade deficit and also suggest a remedy for the problem. But first I need to mention two reasons you might want to be skeptical about what I say. To begin, my forecasting record with respect to macroeconomics is far from inspiring. For example, over the past two decades I was excessively fearful of inflation. More to the point at hand, I started way back in 1987 to publicly worry about our mounting trade deficits-and, as you know, we've not only survived but also thrived. So on the trade front, score at least one "wolf for me. Nevertheless, I am crying wolf again and this time backing it with Berkshire Hathaway's money. Through the spring of 2002, I had lived nearly 72 years without purchasing a foreign currency. Since then Berkshire has made significant investments in-and today holds-several currencies. I won't give you particulars; in fact, it is largely irrelevant which currencies they are. What does matter is the underlying point: To hold other currencies is to believe that the dollar will decline.
Both as an American and as an investor, I actually hope these commitments prove to be a mistake. Any profits Berkshire might make from currency trading would pale against the losses the company and our shareholders, in other aspects of their lives, would incur from a plunging dollar.
But as head of Berkshire Hathaway, I am in charge of investing its money in ways that make sense. And my reason for finally putting my money where my mouth has been so long is that our trade deficit has greatly worsened, to the point that our country's "net worth," so to speak, is now being transferred abroad at an alarming rate.
A perpetuation of this transfer will lead to major trouble. To understand why, take a wildly fanciful trip with me to two isolated, side-by-side islands of equal size, Squanderville and Thriftville. Land is the only capital asset on these islands, and their communities are primitive, needing only food and producing only food. Working eight hours a day, in fact, each inhabitant can produce enough food to sustain himself or herself. And for a long time that's how things go along. On each island everybody works the prescribed eight hours a day, which means that each society is self-sufficient.
Eventually, though, the industrious citizens of Thriftville decide to do some serious saving and investing, and they start to work 16 hours a day. In this mode they continue to live off the food they produce in eight hours of work but begin exporting an equal amount to their one and only trading outlet, Squanderville.
The citizens of Squanderville are ecstatic about this turn of events, since they can now live their lives free from toil but eat as well as ever. Oh, yes, there's a quid pro quo-but to the Squanders, it seems harmless: All that the Thrifts want in exchange for their food is Squander-bonds (which are denominated, naturally, in Squanderbucks).
Over time Thriftville accumulates an enormous amount of these bonds, which at their core represent claim checks on the future output of Squanderville. A few pundits in Squanderville smell trouble coming. They foresee that for the Squanders both to eat and to pay off-or simply service-the debt they're piling up will eventually require them to work more than eight hours a day. But the residents of Squanderville are in no mood to listen to such doomsaying.
Meanwhile, the citizens of Thriftville begin to get nervous. Just how good, they ask, are the IOUs of a shiftless island? So the Thrifts change strategy. Though they continue to hold some bonds, they sell most of them to Squanderville residents for Squanderbucks and use the proceeds to buy Squanderville land. And eventually the Thrifts own all of Squanderville.
At that point, the Squanders are forced to deal with an ugly equation: They must now not only return to working eight hours a day in order to eat-they have nothing left to trade-but must also work additional hours to service their debt and pay Thriftville rent on the land so imprudently sold. In effect, Squanderville has been colonized by purchase rather than conquest.
It can be argued, of course, that the present value of the future production that Squanderville must forever ship to Thriftville only equates to the production Thriftville initially gave up and that therefore both have received a fair deal. But since one generation of Squanders gets the free ride and future generations pay in perpetuity for it, there are-in economist talk-some pretty dramatic "intergenerational inequities."
Let's think of it in terms of a family: Imagine that I, Warren Buffett, can get the suppliers of all that I consume in my lifetime to take Buffett family IOUs that are payable, in goods and services and with interest added, by my descendants. This scenario may be viewed as effecting an even trade between the Buffett family unit and its creditors. But the generations of Buffetts following me are not likely to applaud the deal (and, heaven forbid, may even attempt to welsh on it).
Think again about those islands: Sooner or later the Squanderville government, facing ever greater payments to service debt, would decide to embrace highly inflationary policies-that is, issue more Squanderbucks to dilute the value of each. After all, the government would reason, those irritating Squanderbonds are simply claims on specific numbers of Squanderbucks, not on bucks of specific value. In short, making Squanderbucks less valuable would ease the island's fiscal pain.
That prospect is why I, were I a resident of Thriftville, would opt for direct ownership of Squanderville land rather than bonds of the island's government. Most governments find it much harder morally to seize foreign-owned property than they do to dilute the purchasing power of claim checks foreigners hold. Theft by stealth is preferred to theft by force.
So what does all this island hopping have to do with the U.S.? Simply put, after World War II and up until the early 1970s we operated in the industrious Thriftville style, regularly selling more abroad than we purchased. We concurrently invested our surplus abroad, with the result that our net investment-that is, our holdings of foreign assets less foreign holdings of U.S. assets-increased (under methodology, since revised, that the government was then using) from $37 billion in 1950 to $68 billion in 1970. In those days, to sum up, our country's "net worth," viewed in totality, consisted of all the wealth within our borders plus a modest portion of the wealth in the rest of the world.
Additionally, because the U.S. was in a net ownership position with respect to the rest of the world, we realized net investment income that, piled on top of our trade surplus, became a second source of investable funds. Our fiscal situation was thus similar to that of an individual who was both saving some of his salary and reinvesting the dividends from his existing nest egg.
In the late 1970s the trade situation reversed, producing deficits that initially ran about 1% of GDP. That was hardly serious, particularly because net investment income remained positive. Indeed, with the power of compound interest working for us, our net ownership balance hit its high in 1980 at $360 billion.
Since then, however, it's been all downhill, with the pace of decline rapidly accelerating in the past five years. Our annual trade deficit now exceeds 4% of GDP. Equally ominous, the rest of the world owns a staggering $2.5 trillion more of the U.S. than we own of other countries. Some of this $2.5 trillion is invested in claim checks-U.S. bonds, both governmental and private-and some in such assets as property and equity securities.
In effect, our country has been behaving like an extraordinarily rich family that possesses an immense farm. In order to consume 4% more than we produce-that's the trade deficit-we have, day by day, been both selling pieces of the farm and increasing the mortgage on what we still own.
To put the $2.5 trillion of net foreign ownership in perspective, contrast it with the $12 trillion value of publicly owned U.S. stocks or the equal amount of U.S. residential real estate or what I would estimate as a grand total of $50 trillion in national wealth. Those comparisons show that what's already been transferred abroad is meaningful-in the area, for example, of 5% of our national wealth.
More important, however, is that foreign ownership of our assets will grow at about $500 billion per year at the present trade-deficit level, which means that the deficit will be adding about one percentage point annually to foreigners' net ownership of our national wealth. As that ownership grows, so will the annual net investment income flowing out of this country. That will leave us paying ever-increasing dividends and interest to the world rather than being a net receiver of them, as in the past. We have entered the world of negative compounding-goodbye pleasure, hello pain.
We were taught in Economics 101 that countries could not for long sustain large, ever-growing trade deficits. At a point, so it was claimed, the spree of the consumption-happy nation would be braked by currency-rate adjustments and by the unwillingness of creditor countries to accept an endless flow of IOUs from the big spenders. And that's the way it has indeed worked for the rest of the world, as we can see by the abrupt shutoffs of credit that many profligate nations have suffered in recent decades.
The U.S., however, enjoys special status. In effect, we can behave today as we wish because our past financial behavior was so exemplary-and because we are so rich. Neither our capacity nor our intention to pay is questioned, and we continue to have a mountain of desirable assets to trade for consumables. In other words, our national credit card allows us to charge truly breathtaking amounts. But that card's credit line is not limitless.
The time to halt this trading of assets for consumables is now, and I have a plan to suggest for getting it done. My remedy may sound gimmicky, and in truth it is a tariff called by another name. But this is a tariff that retains most free-market virtues, neither protecting specific industries nor punishing specific countries nor encouraging trade wars. This plan would increase our exports and might well lead to increased overall world trade. And it would balance our books without there being a significant decline in the value of the dollar, which I believe is otherwise almost certain to occur.
We would achieve this balance by issuing what I will call Import Certificates (ICs) to all U.S. exporters in an amount equal to the dollar value of their exports. Each exporter would, in turn, sell the ICs to parties-either exporters abroad or importers here-wanting to get goods into the U.S. To import $1 million of goods, for example, an importer would need ICs that were the byproduct of $1 million of exports. The inevitable result: trade balance.
Because our exports total about $80 billion a month, ICs would be issued in huge, equivalent quantities-that is, 80 billion certificates a month-and would surely trade in an exceptionally liquid market. Competition would then determine who among those parties wanting to sell to us would buy the certificates and how much they would pay. (I visualize that the certificates would be issued with a short life, possibly of six months, so that speculators would be discouraged from accumulating them.)
For illustrative purposes, let's postulate that each IC would sell for 10 cents-that is, 10 cents per dollar of exports behind them. Other things being equal, this amount would mean a U.S. producer could realize 10% more by selling his goods in the export market than by selling them domestically, with the extra 10% coming from his sales of ICs.
In my opinion, many exporters would view this as a reduction in cost, one that would let them cut the prices of their products in international markets. Commodity-type products would particularly encourage this kind of behavior. If aluminum, for example, was selling for 66 cents per pound domestically and ICs were worth 10%, domestic aluminum producers could sell for about 60 cents per pound (plus transportation costs) in foreign markets and still earn normal margins. In this scenario, the output of the U.S. would become significantly more competitive and exports would expand. Along the way, the number of jobs would grow.
Foreigners selling to us, of course, would face tougher economics. But that's a problem they're up against no matter what trade "solution" is adopted-and make no mistake, a solution must come. (As Herb Stein said, "If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.") In one way the IC approach would give countries selling to us great flexibility, since the plan does not penalize any specific industry or product. In the end, the free market would determine what would be sold in the U.S. and who would sell it. The ICs would determine only the aggregate dollar volume of what was sold.
To see what would happen to imports, let's look at a car now entering the U.S. at a cost to the importer of $20,000. Under the new plan and the assumption that ICs sell for 10%, the importer's cost would rise to $22,000. If demand for the car was exceptionally strong, the importer might manage to pass all of this on to the American consumer. In the usual case, however, competitive forces would take hold, requiring the foreign manufacturer to absorb some, if not all, of the $2,000 IC cost.
There is no free lunch in the IC plan: It would have certain serious negative consequences for U.S. citizens. Prices of most imported products would increase, and so would the prices of certain competitive products manufactured domestically. The cost of the ICs, either in whole or in part, would therefore typically act as a tax on consumers.
That is a serious drawback. But there would be drawbacks also to the dollar continuing to lose value or to our increasing tariffs on specific products or instituting quotas on them-courses of action that in my opinion offer a smaller chance of success. Above all, the pain of higher prices on goods imported today dims beside the pain we will eventually suffer if we drift along and trade away ever larger portions of our country's net worth.
I believe that ICs would produce, rather promptly, a U.S. trade equilibrium well above present export levels but below present import levels. The certificates would moderately aid all our industries in world competition, even as the free market determined which of them ultimately met the test of "comparative advantage."
This plan would not be copied by nations that are net exporters, because their ICs would be valueless. Would major exporting countries retaliate in other ways? Would this start another Smoot-Hawley tariff war? Hardly. At the time of Smoot-Hawley we ran an unreasonable trade surplus that we wished to maintain. We now run a damaging deficit that the whole world knows we must correct.
For decades the world has struggled with a shifting maze of punitive tariffs, export subsidies, quotas, dollar-locked currencies, and the like. Many of these import-inhibiting and export-encouraging devices have long been employed by major exporting countries trying to amass ever larger surpluses-yet significant trade wars have not erupted. Surely one will not be precipitated by a proposal that simply aims at balancing the books of the world's largest trade debtor. Major exporting countries have behaved quite rationally in the past and they will continue to do so-though, as always, it may be in their interest to attempt to convince us that they will behave otherwise.
The likely outcome of an IC plan is that the exporting nations-after some initial posturing-will turn their ingenuity to encouraging imports from us. Take the position of China, which today sells us about $140 billion of goods and services annually while purchasing only $25 billion. Were ICs to exist, one course for China would be simply to fill the gap by buying 115 billion certificates annually. But it could alternatively reduce its need for ICs by cutting its exports to the U.S. or by increasing its purchases from us. This last choice would probably be the most palatable for China, and we should wish it to be so.
If our exports were to increase and the supply of ICs were therefore to be enlarged, their market price would be driven down. Indeed, if our exports expanded sufficiently, ICs would be rendered valueless and the entire plan made moot. Presented with the power to make this happen, important exporting countries might quickly eliminate the mechanisms they now use to inhibit exports from us.
Were we to install an IC plan, we might opt for some transition years in which we deliberately ran a relatively small deficit, a step that would enable the world to adjust as we gradually got where we need to be. Carrying this plan out, our government could either auction "bonus" ICs every month or simply give them, say, to less-developed countries needing to increase their exports. The latter course would deliver a form of foreign aid likely to be particularly effective and appreciated.
I will close by reminding you again that I cried wolf once before. In general, the batting average of doomsayers in the U.S. is terrible. Our country has consistently made fools of those who were skeptical about either our economic potential or our resiliency. Many pessimistic seers simply underestimated the dynamism that has allowed us to overcome problems that once seemed ominous. We still have a truly remarkable country and economy.
But I believe that in the trade deficit we also have a problem that is going to test all of our abilities to find a solution. A gently declining dollar will not provide the answer. True, it would reduce our trade deficit to a degree, but not by enough to halt the outflow of our country's net worth and the resulting growth in our investment-income deficit.
Perhaps there are other solutions that make more sense than mine. However, wishful thinking-and its usual companion, thumb sucking-is not among them. From what I now see, action to halt the rapid outflow of our national wealth is called for, and ICs seem the least painful and most certain way to get the job done. Just keep remembering that this is not a small problem: For example, at the rate at which the rest of the world is now making net investments in the U.S., it could annually buy and sock away nearly 4% of our publicly traded stocks.
In evaluating business options at Berkshire, my partner, Charles Munger, suggests that we pay close attention to his jocular wish: "All I want to know is where I'm going to die, so I'll never go there." Framers of our trade policy should heed this caution-and steer clear of Squanderville.
FEEDBACK cloomis@fortunemail.com
[Sidebar]
Through the spring of 2002, I had lived nearly 72 years without purchasing a foreign currency. That has changed.
[Sidebar]
Why Foreigners Can't Ditch Their Dollars
HOW OFTEN HAVE YOU SEEN A COMMENT LIKE THIS IN ARTICLES ABOUT the U.S. dollar? "Analysts say that what really worries them is that foreigners will start moving out of the dollar."
Next time you see something like that, dismiss it. The fact is that foreigners-as a whole-cannot ditch their dollars. Indeed, because our trade deficit is constantly putting new dollars into the hands of foreigners, they have to just as constantly increase their U.S. investments.
It's true, of course, that the rest of the world can choose which U.S. assets to hold. They can decide, for example, to sell U.S. bonds to buy U.S. stocks. Or they can make a move into real estate, as the Japanese did in the 1980s. Moreover, any of those moves, particularly if they are carried out by anxious sellers or buyers, can influence the price of the dollar.
But imagine that the Japanese both want to get out of their U.S. real estate and entirely away from dollar assets. They can't accomplish that by selling their real estate to Americans, because they will get paid in dollars. And if they sell their real estate to non-Americans-say, the French, for euros-the property will remain in the hands of foreigners. With either kind of sale, the dollar assets held by the rest of the world will not (except for any concurrent shift in the price of the dollar) have changed.
The bottom line is that other nations simply can't disinvest in the U.S. unless they, as a universe, buy more goods and services from us than we buy from them. That state of affairs would be called an American trade surplus, and we don't have one.
You can dream up some radical plots for changing the situation. For example, the rest of the world could send the U.S. massive foreign aid that would serve to offset our trade deficit. But under any realistic view of things, our huge trade deficit guarantees that the rest of the world must not only hold the American assets it owns but consistently add to them. And that's why, of course, our national net worth is gradually shifting away from our shores.
An ominous fact: The rest of the world owns a staggering $2.5 trillion more of the U.S. than we own of other countries. |
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