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发表于 2014-1-11 01:37
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本帖最后由 野狐禅 于 2014-1-11 02:59 编辑
看到这么一篇文章，觉得挺有意思，翻译了一下
中国快车正在脱轨
By Patrick Chovanec Jan 2, 2014
金融大戏正在中国新的一年开始时上演。上周，还有一次是在六个月前，利率在关键的银行间拆借市场飙升10％以上，产生了将因流动性危机而触发大规模违约，并削弱世界第二大经济体的担忧。
西方投资者很大程度上忽略了现金短缺，未能把握其潜在意义。虽然这个情况已经因为中国人民银行匆忙注入至少为$550亿入市很大程度上缓解了，但这不是故事的结尾。这些重复的危机，在全球经济的其他令人不安因素的影响下，是中国的投资驱动型增长模式的基础正在崩溃的征兆。
那些在六月份中国第一次银行危机时割肉的人真是运气，这次危机的出现是毫无征兆可循。人们到处寻找解释：也许可以责怪一些季节性飙升提取现金，或美国联邦储备委员会的调节其债券购买政策。乐观者认为中国人民银行是故意收紧信贷，以警示银行在不安全的贷款做法收服。随着通胀在可控的水平，他们的理由，中国的人民银行有充足的空间来再次放松货币政策，缓解现金危机。
事实上，宽松的货币政策本身是问题，而不是解决方案。两个字 - 坏账。这是理解为什么中国有太多的钱，但还不够的关键。自全球金融危机以来，中国积累了可观的增长，在国内生产总值（GDP）工程的投资热潮的带动下，宽松的信贷激增。总债务急剧上升，从2008年的125 ％的国内生产总值到 2012年的215 ％。信贷已从2008年年底的$9兆（trillion）美元激增至24兆美元。这个额外的15兆美元 - 相当于美国整个商业银行的规模 - 是在短短五年间借出的。
大量的这些钱进入能抬高该国的经济统计数据，但不能产生回报的项目。据官方报告，中国的银行只有不到1 ％的不良贷款率。事实上，他们包装了这些巨额坏账，也包括他们自己的坏账，卖成零售投资理财产品 - 其中许多是非常短期的 - ，并承诺越来越高的回报率。
中国的银行可以通过玩这个骗局隐藏坏账，但并不能改变一个事实，即他们没有能收回他们的投资。冻结现有的项目的资本，扩大信贷是他们可以资助下一轮大投资的唯一方法 - 并保持中国国内生产总值增长率不崩溃。越来越多的新增信贷更是侵蚀由那堆坏账产生的虚假的回报。
今年，总信贷在中国同比增长约20 ％，一个非常高的基数 - 难以紧缩银根。中国的银行对现金需求并不象表明上看到的那样。除了其宣称的资产负债表外，每家银行其实都有一大堆泡沫资产以及隐藏的现金债务（准存款的形式） 即隐蔽资产负债表。控制信贷增长，甚至是很温和的控制，立刻就会产生现金短缺。
这就是中国当局在6月，然后在上周发现的情况。在这两种情况下，中国人民银行都没有能减少收紧信贷的冲击，它只是试图抵御更大的冲击。结果，这两个时期，都出现一个近乎崩盘的银行间拆借市场，并表现出会产生能威胁整个经济的雪崩式破产。现在，没有迹象表明财务压力仅限于银行间市场：在过去的几个月里，中国政府和企业债券的收益率一直在上升，即使经济在放缓。
中国人民银行确实可以通过注入更多现金来制止眼前的流动性危机。但在这样做的同时，也事实上失去对影子银行债务的控制。放贷会继续，坏账会更高，然后需要更多的现金来掩盖真实的损失。因此，投入更多的现金只会在死胡同里走得更远。
这个酝酿中的风暴比许多全球投资者意识到的要大得多。中国信贷推动的投资热潮一直是金属价格和机械出口的驱动力。中国已成为全球最大的汽车市场，最大的石油进口国，最大的黄金买家。虽然外资银行相对较少直接接触到中国金融市场，但其资本在中国的流入和流出很可能已大到足以严重影响通常不与中国相关的资产类型。中国金融列车撞毁的话，将足以震撼全球市场。
政府在11月出版市场化改革的具体蓝图，给了很多人希望。中国的领导人清醒地认识到其经济需要一个新的移动方向。但第一个关键步骤，中国远离其成瘾的债务拉动型的刺激方案，正在被证明是一个远比想象中难的事。中国领导人正在一辆失控的火车上，不太知道如何让火车停下来。而这火车正在脱轨。
China’s Runaway Train Is Running Out of Track
By Patrick Chovanec Jan 2, 2014 5:00 PM CT
A financial drama is unfolding in China as the new year begins. Last week, for the second time in six months, interest rates in the critical interbank lending market spiked above 10 percent, prompting fears of a liquidity crisis that would trigger mass defaults and cripple the world’s second-largest economy.
Western investors largely ignored the cash crunch and failed to grasp its potential significance. Although the situation has largely eased after the People’s Bank of China hastily injected at least $55 billion into the market, that isn’t the end of the story. These repeated crises are a sign that the foundations of China’s investment-driven growth model are crumbling -- with unsettling implications for the rest of the global economy.
To those who wrote off China’s first banking seizure in June as a fluke, this latest episode appeared to come out of nowhere. They cast about for explanations: Perhaps some seasonal surge in cash withdrawals was to blame, or the U.S. Federal Reserve’s decision to taper its bond-buying policy. Optimists assumed the PBOC was tightening credit on purpose, as a warning to banks to rein in unsafe lending practices. With inflation at manageable levels, they reasoned, the People’s Bank of China had plenty of room to loosen monetary policy again and ease the cash crunch.
In fact, loose monetary policy is the problem, not the solution. Two simple words -- bad debt -- are the key to understanding why China has too much money, yet not enough. In the years since the global financial crisis, China has racked up impressive growth in gross domestic product by engineering an investment boom, fueled by a surge in easy credit. Total debt has risen sharply, from 125 percent of GDP in 2008 to 215 percent in 2012. Credit has spiraled to $24 trillion from $9 trillion at the end of 2008. That’s an additional $15 trillion - - the size of the entire U.S. commercial banking sector -- lent out in just five years.
A lot of that money has gone into projects whose purpose was to inflate the country’s economic statistics, not to generate a return. Officially, China’s banks report a nonperforming loan ratio of less than 1 percent. In reality, they are rolling over huge amounts of bad debt, both on their own books and by repackaging it into retail investment products -- many of them extremely short-term -- that promise ever higher rates of return.
China’s banks can hide bad debt by playing this shell game, yet that doesn’t change the fact that they’re not getting their money back. With their capital locked up in existing projects, the only way they can finance the next round of big investments -- and keep China’s GDP growth rates from collapsing -- is by expanding credit. More and more of that new credit is now eaten up paying imaginary returns on the growing pile of bad debt.
This year, total credit in China grew about 20 percent, from an extremely high base -- hardly tight money. Yet the cash needs of China’s banks aren’t what they seem. In addition to its declared balance sheet, each bank is juggling a host of dubious assets and hidden cash obligations (in the form of quasi-deposits) on what amounts to a “shadow” balance sheet. Rein in credit growth, even modestly, and there isn’t enough to go around.
That’s what Chinese authorities discovered in June, and again last week. In both instances, the People’s Bank of China didn’t take away the punch bowl by tightening credit, it merely tried to resist handing over an even bigger punch bowl. The result, both times, was a near-meltdown in the interbank lending market that threatened to unleash a cascade of defaults throughout the economy. Nor have the signs of financial stress been limited to the interbank market: Over the past few months, yields on Chinese government and corporate bonds have steadily risen, even as the economy slows.
The PBOC could, and did, halt the immediate liquidity crisis by injecting more cash. But in doing so, it effectively cedes control over monetary policy to the shadow banks. Runaway lending continues, bad debts mount even higher, and the need for more cash to paper over losses becomes that much more acute. Far from solving the problem, pumping in more cash just kicks the can farther down a dead-end street.
The implications of this brewing storm are bigger than many global investors realize. China’s credit-fueled investment boom has been a driver of metals prices and machinery exports. China has become the world’s largest automobile market, its largest oil importer, and its largest buyer of gold. Although foreign banks have relatively little direct exposure to Chinese financial markets, capital flows into and out of the mainland are potentially large enough to have a significant impact on asset classes not normally associated with China. A financial train wreck would send tremors through global markets.
The detailed blueprint for market reform published by the Communist Party in November encouraged many. China’s leaders clearly recognize that its economy needs to move in a new direction. But the first crucial step, weaning China away from its addiction to debt-fueled stimulus, is proving a lot harder than many imagined. China’s leaders are riding a runaway train that they don’t quite know how to stop. And they’re running out of track.
(Patrick Chovanec is managing director and chief strategist at Silvercrest Asset Management, and a former associate professor at Tsinghua University’s School of Economics and Management. Follow him on Twitter at @prchovanec.)
To contact the writer of this article: Patrick Chovanec at pchovanec@silvercrestgroup.com.
To contact the editor responsible for this article: Nisid Hajari at nhajari@bloomberg.net.
©2014 Bloomberg L.P. All Rights Reserved
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发表于 2014-1-7 05:42
